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O estudo investiga startups que participaram em programas de aceleração e olha para fatores 
que afetam o sucesso da startup. Especificamente, este trabalho apurou que a 
desaprendizagem que ocorre dentro das aceleradoras é crucial para a aprendizagem do 
empreendedor. Os resultados negativos de empreendedores anteriores não mostraram um 
impacto significativo na desaprendizagem. 
Além disso, analisou que o empreendimento pode aumentar sua tecnologia, mercado e 
especificamente no conhecimento empresarial. A tecnologia e o conhecimento empresarial 
foram identificados para melhorar os resultados dos empreendimentos de forma notável. Por 
isso, foram estabelecidas duas amostras investigadas dentro de um estudo empírico 
qualitativo e um quantitativo que derivam da aceleradora Building Global Innovators e de 
diversos aceleradores de startups da Websummit. 
The study investigates startups that participated in acceleration programs and looks at factors 
that affect the startup success. Specifically, this work investigated that unlearning takes place 
within accelerators and it is crucial for the entrepreneur’s learning. Negative prior venture 
outcomes did not show to significantly impact unlearning. Moreover, it analysed that the 
venture can increase its technology, market and specifically in business knowledge. 
Technology and Business knowledge was identified to improve outcomes of ventures in a 
remarkable way. For this sake, two samples investigated within a qualitative and within a 
quantitative empirical study were established who stem from the Building Global Innovators 
accelerator and diverse accelerators from startups from the Websummit. 
Keywords: Accelerator, unlearning, learning, technology knowledge, business knowledge, 
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1. Introduction  
Startups have increased in the past years and so have startup accelerators. Indeed, at the end 
of 2016 there are aggregated 187 programs worldwide who accelerated roughly 6495 
companies, led to 869 exits for found $ 5 billion and got funding for round $ 22 billion 
(Christiansen, 2016; Mian, Lamine and Fayolle, 2016; Regmi, Ahmed, and Quinn, 2015). 
An accelerator by definition is an institution helping newly created businesses by providing 
education and mentorship in cohorts of founders for a limited period (Cohen and Hochberg, 
2014) and is addressing the life support of ventures (Mian et al., 2016). The rise in 
accelerators might be because the startup failure rate is still high (Laitinen, 1992; Shepherd 
et al. 2000). Reasons for these failures can be for example inadequate funding or no efficient 
marketing (Storey, 1994). Because of that, businesses used to rely on support programs like 
Venture Capital firms (investors funding startups when they emerged from early stages of 
the venture (Dempwolf, Auer, and D’Ippolito, 2014)), Angel investors (individual investors 
providing seed capital and varying amount of advice for young ventures (Cohen, 2013)), 
Bootstrapping (funding from own sources, relatives and friends (Salamzadeh and 
Kawamorita, 2015)) or incubators (co-working spaces sharing resources and ad hoc 
mentorship at best in exchange for fees Cohen and Hochberg, 2014)). Since 2005 a new 
business model emerged to increases the performance of emerging businesses, the so-called 
accelerators (Hellen, Bingham, and Cohen, 2016).  
Ventures that come to an accelerator often have derived some fundamental assumptions for 
their businesses and normally designed a business plan which defines the strategy of their 
future growth. They create a mental framework of how the environment is working to have 
a common language and an understanding of the environmental task as well as a means to 
interpret events (Hellen, et al., 2016; Hill and Levenhagen, 1995; Morgan and Berthon, 
2008; Salamzadeh and Kawamorita Kesim, 2015; Tsang and Zahra, 2008). When joining the 
accelerator programs though, ventures often find out, that their information was wrong or 
that their assumptions were unrealistic because they have lacked knowledge, or did not 
assess the market properly to proof validity of their startup (Hellen, et al, 2016; Morgan and 
Berthon, 2008; Salamzadeh and Kawamorita Kesim, 2015; Van Weele and Van Rijnsoever, 
2015). So, they might need to engage in the process of unlearning while talking to others 
and gaining support (Hill and Levenhagen, 1995; Van Weele and Van Rijnsoever, 2015), to 
get the most out of their venture while participating in an accelerator program (Sweet, 2012).  
Despite this reasoning for accelerators, the study of Hellen et al. (2016) reveals that not all 
accelerators are effective yet and entrepreneurs should investigate with caution before 
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considering a participation. This ambiguity of the contribution of accelerators to startups 
together with a lack of extensive research makes clear that accelerators still need to be 
investigated in more detail (Cohen and Hochberg, 2014; Regmi, et al., 2015). Programs are 
very heterogeneous in objectives and outcomes and there is not much research about which 
ones are more effective and why (Cohen and Hochberg, 2014). Research on accelerators has 
not focused either on the unlearning process and contents of accelerators clearly yet. 
Research until now is mostly descriptive and sometimes the institution is confused with 
different incubation models (e.g. incubators) and generally focuses around the role and 
efficacy of the programs (Cohen and Hochberg, 2014; Hochberg, 2015; Mian et al., 2016).  
Unlearning literature mostly concerns around how organizations can change their existing 
organizational patterns to leverage their performance (Tsang and Zahra, 2008). Within this 
literature it is argued that unlearning leverages business innovation and business 
performance (Morgan and Berthon, 2008; Sherwood, 2000, Sweet, 2012). Nevertheless, 
unlearning has not been researched extensively despite being a valuable entrepreneurial 
learning concept (Akgün, Lynn and Reilly, 2002; Cope, 2005; Lane, White and Djurfeldt, 
1995; Tsang and Zahra, 2008). Also, it is not clear if unlearning is a precondition for learning 
(Nystrom and Starbuck, 2015; Tsang and Zahra, 2008). Wang et al. (2014), who elaborated 
on entrepreneurial learning, highlighted that the future research question should understand, 
how and what entrepreneurs unlearn, since it contributes to opportunity exploration and 
exploitation of startups. Literature applying learning theories within accelerators is 
furthermore hard to find and startups are researched specifically sparsely within 
organizational learning (Franco and Haase 2009; Wang et al., 2014). 
Since accelerators are not overall facilitating the venture progress (Hellen et al., 2016) it 
seems like there is still room for improvement. Research also still is not elaborated around 
the field of accelerators (Dempwolf, Auer and D’Ippolito). The unlearning process and 
content of entrepreneurs especially within accelerators is not given enough attention to so 
far either (Akgün, Lynn and Reilly, 2002; Lane, White and Djurfeldt, 1995). It would 
nevertheless be interesting for members of entrepreneurial ventures to know how they need 
to adopt within accelerator programs in order to fully take advantage of the support offered. 
Also, studies prove that this unlearning behavior leads to better firm performance (Morgan 
and Berthon, 2008; Baker and Sinkular, 1999; Cope, 2011), what speaks for a high relevance 
for startups. The nascent ventures might further leverage principles of how best to unlearn 
during their venture development process, because this involves redesigning the minimum 
viable product according to market needs (Parker, 2006). Therefore, the questions arise,  
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How and what do entrepreneurial firms unlearn within Accelerator programs and 
what are the outcomes?  
 How do entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial firms learn and unlearn? 
 Do ventures unlearn within accelerators? 
 Are previous venture failures critical triggers for unlearning? 
 Which characteristics do accelerators have and why do startups participate within those? 
 How does the unlearning process look like for a startup within an accelerator? 
 What knowledge is likely to be unlearned during the accelerator process?  
 Did unlearning contribute to learning and outcomes? 
To analyze these issues, the following work will proceed with a literature review, 
investigating entrepreneurial learning and unlearning as well as accelerators. In the next 
section, a qualitative and quantitative study will be provided analyzing the unlearning 
behavior of startups participating in an accelerator. Afterwards, results are being analyzed, 
and limitations and a conclusions will be drawn. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Entrepreneurial Learning 
Definition of Entrepreneurial Learning 
Since the importance of entrepreneurship is rising, so is entrepreneurial opportunity 
exploration and exploitation and therefore also entrepreneurial learning (EL) to successfully 
develop ventures (Regmi, et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2014). Through learning entrepreneurs 
are able to develop and grow their businesses and eventually become successful business 
owners (Rae and Carswell, 2000). EL leads to increased opportunity recognition, in that 
entrepreneurs will have more relevant information to identify opportunities and will better 
develop cognitive abilities to value it (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Also, EL leverages 
the effectiveness of coping with liabilities of newness like access to financial facilities, social 
networks and legitimacy (Politis, 2005).  
EL can be defined in different ways. It spans over: 
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“‘learning that ‘informs the entrepreneur’s quest for new opportunity’ (Franco and 
Haase 2009, p. 634) or ‘how entrepreneurs accumulate and update knowledge’ 
(Minniti and Bygrave 2001, p. 8) (Wang and Chugh, p. 30, 2014). 
According to Wang et al. (2014) the key learning types, corresponding to three key 
challenges in EL research, belongs exploratory and exploitative learning. Exploratory 
learning is focused on information seeking and the discovery of new knowledge through 
enactment and interpretation (Wang et al., 2014). It relies on “’search, variation, risk taking, 
experimentation, play, flexibility, [and] discovery’” (March, 1991, p.71). Exploitative 
learning often builds upon leveraging existing knowledge and means “’refinement, choice, 
production, efficiency, selection, implementation [and] execution; March, 1991, p.71, Wang 
et al., 2014).  
 
Definition of Higher Order Learning 
Human knowledge can be described as assumptions, generalizations, pictures and images 
that serve as basis for our understanding of the world and how we interact in it (Senge, 1990) 
or as a context for understanding and relating new material (Kim, 1993). If a company needs 
to reorient human capital, they need to combine existing capabilities with newly acquired 
knowledge and to unlearn non-relevant knowledge (Holan and Philips, 2004). The systems 
perspective of Senge (1990) claims that concepts of learning and unlearning rely on notions 
of how people use information flows and feedback in organizations (mental frameworks) to 
build and understanding of the world’s existence and its mechanisms. 
Within previous research most studies refer with organizational learning to the acquisition 
of new knowledge, as opposed to higher order learning (HOL), where previous knowledge 
is present (Nystrom and Starbuck, 2015; Tsang and Zahra, 2008). It is emphasized by Tsang 
and Zahra (2008) that the importance of the interplay of individual and organizational 
unlearning. The authors state that unlearning at the individual level is a precondition for 
organizational unlearning.  
Wang et al. (2014) highlighted that the future research question should understand, how and 
what entrepreneurs unlearn. HOL could be assigned to the exploratory learning form 
(Morgan and Berthon, 2008). It can either happen adaptive (cumulative learning from 
experiences) or proactive (learning to be sensitized to prevent future critical events) (Cope, 
2001). Organizations need to engage in HOL when existing frames of reference are not able 
to reflect the needs of the environment anymore (Cope 2003; Fiol and Lyles 1985). Authors 
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claim that HOL is contributing to unlearning (Hedberg 1981; Zahra, Abdelgawad, and Tsang 
2011; Wang et al., 2014). It might be important in the entrepreneurial learning process, since 
entrepreneurs are surrounded by a highly uncertain environment in which unlearning is being 
an integrative precondition for it (Nystrom and Starbuck, 2015; Wang et al., 2014).  
 
Entrepreneurial preparedness 
According to Reuber and Fischer (1999) every prospective entrepreneur has a certain 
preparedness when entering a startup. Each individual has inherent certain personal 
attributes and has learnt along personal life cycles and career paths, has a skill assessment 
inventory and has a varying motivation to become an entrepreneur (Harvey and Evans, 
1995). This set of experience, knowledge and personal attitudes shape the individuals beliefs 
and abilities (Starr and Fondas, 1992). EL is thus highly affected by prior learning and the 
product of ones learning during the past (Boud, Cohen and Walker, 1993; Mezirow, 1991) 
which in turn influences the entrepreneur’s future behaviour (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001).  
Harvey and Evans (1995) stress that prospective entrepreneurs should actively assess learned 
skills and abilities before entering in a new business. For this sake, they should reflect on the 
relevance on past experiences, think about if they are ready to engage in a new venture and 
should also assess if the social groups around them help in developing the business and if 
the given environment and opportunity is a comfortable one (Cope, 2005; Harvey and Evans, 
1995).  
For total preparedness prospective entrepreneurs need to look outward in order to interact 
with and learn from the environment to be able to explore opportunities. Furthermore, they 
need to look forward for developing their business successfully. Moreover, they should look 
inside and backwards, reflecting on past experiences and looking into themselves how ready 
they are to start a business again (Cope, 2005; Harvey and Evans, 1995). 
 
2.2 Unlearning 
Definition of Unlearning 
Defining unlearning has been a complex process with various outcomes. Most of the 
definitions refer to a process of losing organizational patterns. Some include that something 
in the organization is being discarded when firms unlearn and some definitions give a value 
judgement on these discarded items saying they were obsolete, misleading, redundant or 
unsuccessful. This could lead to the inference that unlearning is a process of improving. 
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Considering that the research context of this work are accelerators, it can be assumed that 
the discarded will improve situations since accelerator members are a network of experts. 
Also considering the most cited authors when describing unlearning, the definitions fitting 
the best in this context are (Tsang and Zahra, 2008):  
“discarding obsolete or misleading knowledge” (Hedberg, 1981 p. 3), “discovering 
(old ideas’) inadequacies and then discarding them” (Nystrom and Starbuck, 2015, p. 
53) 
Unlearning is the precondition to involve into HOL (Sweet 2012; Hedberg 1981; Zahra et 
al., 2011). Here it clearly comes out that unlearning within the entrepreneurial venture 
creation has not seen lots of research yet, which might also be the case since startups have 
only come up increasingly around the late 90ies with the Internet Boom (Miller and Bound, 
2011; Tsang and Zahra, 2008).  
Comparing the above derived definition of unlearning with the one from HOL, it becomes 
clear that these concepts are intertwined. This unlearning definition however leaves out the 
organizational context, which might be slightly different to a startups’ one. 
 
Triggers of Unlearning 
Cope (2005) argues that significant opportunities and problems (e.g. failures during the 
entrepreneurial process) can create HOL outcomes. This involves radical change and can 
result in a transformation of previous held assumptions and values that serve as a guiding 
principle [mental frameworks] (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Cope, 2005; Mezirow, 1991). As 
a result of these events, organizational processes and strategies might be reviewed (Cope, 
2003). The critical situations are very valuable as well for gaining confidence and 
knowledge, for reflecting on the consequences of one’s own actions and to actively prevent 
the repetition of made mistakes (Cope, 2001). Nevertheless, they can also be traumatic and 
stressful for the entrepreneur’s ongoing career as they question deeply held individual values 
and the senses of oneself (Cope, 2001; Mezirow, 1991). Fiol and Lyles (1985) argue that 
this kind of crisis is even a prerequisite for an individual in order to engage in unlearning. 
Therefore it is hypothesized: 
H1: Entrepreneurs that experienced previous failures will unlearn more than 




Outcomes for firms from unlearning 
Unlearning leverages business innovation and thus business performance (Baker and 
Sinkular, 1999; Cope, 2011 Morgan and Berthon, 2008; Sherwood, 2000, Sweet, 2012).  This 
is due to the fact that this learning type is engaging the organization in idea generation and 
risk taking, which increases innovations by firms as they explore. These generated 
innovations in turn affect business performance (Morgan and Berthon, 2008).  
Unlearning is specifically crucial for relational capital (relationships and knowledge gained 
from those) that leads to a higher competitive advantage. Behaviors and attitudes on these 
relationships may need to be challenged as the environment, customer needs, vendor needs, 
partner and investor needs or market conditions change (Sweet, 2012). 
Additionally, entrepreneurial ventures are gaining a capacity to do things differently (Cope, 
2011), which is crucial since they are facing highly dynamic environments (Wang et al., 
2014). Similarly, Sweet (2012) claims that unlearning further fosters organizational change 
and the ability to absorb knowledge. Startups will know in future that they should not take 
their knowledge for granted and also studies prove that unlearning is positively correlated 
with opportunity recognition, which is a key challenge for entrepreneurs (Sweet, 2012). 
 
2.3 Accelerators 
Definition of Accelerators 
Accelerators are quite recent with the first accelerator, Y Combinator, being established in 
2005 (Cohen and Hochberg, 2014; Hellen, Bingham, and Cohen, 2016).  
According to Cohen and Hochberg (2014) seed accelerators are:  
“A fixed-term, cohort-based program, including mentorship and educational 
components that culminates in a public pitch event or demo-day.” (Cohen and 
Hochberg, 2014, P. 4).  
Ventures participating in accelerator programs are normally early‐stage companies seeking 
support and going through a highly selective application process. (McHugh, Whipple and 
Yang, 2013; Regmi, Ahmed, and Quinn, 2015; Cohen and Hochberg, 2014). Accelerators 
can have either a for-profit or a non-profit aim, a differing strategic focus (industry or 
geographical), vary in the amount of money given and equity taken as well as the duration. 
Moreover, they have specific themes: ecosystem-builder, deal-flow maker or welfare 
stimulator (Pauwels, Clarysse, Wright, and Van Hove, 2016). A co-working space might be 
offered, too. Furthermore, a venture capital firm or angel group affiliation, a link to a 
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corporation, university, non-governmental or governmental institution is possible mostly for 
the sake of funding, promotion and welfare or in case of corporates internal development. 
The managers of accelerators have much experience normally, as they have been 
entrepreneurs or angel investors before (Carvalho, Camacho, Amorim and Esperança, 2015; 
Cohen, 2013; Cohen and Hochberg, 2014; Pauwels, et al., 2016).  
 
Unlearning facilitators within Accelerators 
Learning within the accelerator might happen through the various activities 
(workshop/seminars/trainings, networking, mentoring, alumni service), conditions 
(investment and co-working space) and due to the actors within the process. Those actors 
are likely to be mentors, directors, cohort members, alumnis, investors and experts (Cohen, 
2013; Cohen and Bingham, 2013). Deakins, O’Neil and Mileham (2000) claim that trust, 
respect and shared experience affect the quality of the learning. Hellen, Bingham and Cohen 
(2016) stress that accelerators add value through learning from the experience of others. 
According to Akgün, Lynn and Byme (2006), it is useful to have an outsider on your side to 
break established frameworks. So, they could engage in the process of unlearning while 
talking to others and gaining support (Hill and Levenhagen, 1995), to get the most out of 
their venture while participating in an accelerator program (Sweet, 2012). 
In educational seminars wide topics around entrepreneurship are covered. These seminars 
are thought to round out limited experience and to connect participants with knowledge 
experts. The learning by doing act, emphasized as being crucial for the entrepreneurial 
learning process, could be identified by the workshops or seminars accelerators are likely to 
give (Pauwels et al., 2015). Additionally, managing directors of accelerators are helping the 
portfolio companies to absorb and apply the gained knowledge throughout all activities 
(Cohen, 2013; Pauwels, et al., 2016). Moreover, co-working spaces open opportunities for 
startups to learn from each other and collaborate (Pauwels, et al., 2016). It might happen 
even, that startup participants merge (Oliveira, 2016). 
Also, as Tsang and Zahra (2008) state that unlearning is a precondition for organizational 
unlearning the hypothesis arises: 





The Unlearning Content 
First of all, one would assume the activities of the accelerator to influence unlearning with 
the various actors they meet. Likewise, the composition, education and experience of the 
directors and mentors of the accelerator program can influence what entrepreneurial 
founders learn (Cohen and Bingham, 2013). 
Considering the content that can be unlearned, Van Weele and Van Rijnsoever (2015) 
provide a suitable concept for technology-based startups that enter incubators. Knowledge 
categories span over technology, market and business. Technological knowledge is based on 
technologies, products and processes according to the authors. It includes information on 
product design or manufacturing. Market knowledge concerns around customer needs and 
market operations (Van Weele and Van Rijnsoever, 2015). The distinction between those 
two knowledge types is further stressed by Agarwal et al. (2004) and Marvel and Lumpkin 
(2007). According to these authors and Sullivan and Marvel (2011) these knowledge types 
are important for explaining the firm outcomes product/service innovativeness. These 
outcomes will be further enhanced through reliance on networks as accelerators normally 
have (Sullivan and Marvel, 2011). 
Business or organizational knowledge, which is further important for startups is about the 
starting, managing and growing procedure of a startup. This knowledge sets standards for 
entrepreneurs how to hire employees, raise capital, define a business plan and how to draft 
a contract (Becker and Gassmann, 2006; Hellen, Bingham and Cohen, 2016; Van Weele and 
Van Rijnsoever, 2015). However, it might be context specific (here e.g. through the product 
stage) and industry specific how to define relevant knowledge (Cope, 2005; Sexton, Upton, 
Wacholtz, and McDougall, 1997).  
Hence:  
H3: Unlearning within accelerators increases a) market knowledge, b) business 
knowledge and c) technology knowledge. 
 
Outcomes for firms from unlearning within accelerators 
Startups can build more investor ties and thus are able to survive longer and raise more 
capital (Mejia and Gopal, 2015). Hellen, Bingham, and Cohen (2016) further identified three 
key milestones reached by accelerated ventures sooner than by non-participants: funding, 
revenue and customer traction. According to Miller and Bound (2011) further reasons for 
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accelerator participation for start-ups are a peer support group, pressure and discipline 
pushing the business, business and product advice as well as validation for the start-up. 
Ventures also gain positive reputation, which increases their dissemination (Mindruta 
Moeen, and Agarwal 2016; Sørensen 2007; Spence 1973).  
Through mentorship events startups can faster generate prototypes and revenue and gain in 
alternative strategies (Cohen, 2013; Mejia and Gopal, 2015). Seminars provide startups with 
specific knowledge (Cohen, 2013; Pauwels, Clarysse, Wright, and Van Hove, 2016). Co-
working spaces further help startups receiving feedback (Pauwels, et al., 2016) and even can 
lead to a business merger (Oliveira, 2016).  
Also, accelerators facilitate the unlearning process. The accelerator for example can show 
them possible positive outcomes based on the vast experience they are likely to have. The is 
an expert on the startup’s side when going through the emotional complex unlearning 
process (Cope, 2001; Mezirow, 1991). 
Considering all this, to participate within accelerators is a great chance for young ventures. 
The participation and followed validation of their mental frameworks is an opportunity for 
new ventures to assess their idea before going to the market (Carvalho, Camacho, Amorim 
and Esperança, 2015). And if this were assumptions that derived significantly from reality 
or feasibility they have a chance to restructure and rethink and thus have a kind of pre-
assessment for their business before engaging into figures. Thus, it is a way for a startup to 
prevent failure which is very likely for those kind of businesses nowadays (Laitinen, 1992; 
Shepherd et al. 2000). To unlearn is on the other hand a general beneficial experience for 
entrepreneurs (Sweet, 2012). They ideally will learn that they should not rely on their 
personal mental frameworks also and in future eventually rethink twice (Harvey and Evans, 
1995).  
Therefore, the hypothesis arises: 
H4: Changes in a) market knowledge, b) business knowledge and technology 
knowledge are positively related to sales, number of employess, faced growth success 
level two years after the program 
 





Figure 1 Simplified Unlearning process within accelerators 
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3. Empirical study 
3.1 Methodology 
The methodology of this work is a mixed method. This method was chosen as it enriches 
data and is the seen as the best way to achieve an answer to the research question. Both, 
observable factors (e.g. outcomes from ventures like sales) and subjective meanings (e.g. 
when a learning is considered a learning or which learning increase which knowledge types) 
can provide acceptable knowledge (Wahyuni, 2012). As the matter of studying is a quite 
recent subject (Hellen, et al., 2016) the study started with exploratory interviews helping to 
understand whether the unlearning phenomena is present. This phenomena was then 
assessed within a quantitative study with the research method of a further interviews and 
surveys for bringing additional insights. For both types of studies the in the literature derived 






BGI was contacted by an E-mail asking for alumnis to participate in the study. Then 
exploratory interviews were conducted. All information gathered should help to draw certain 
conclusions about if and how the small business has discarded knowledge within the 
accelerator by an open way of asking questions. To analyze results, answers were reviewed 
for commonalities or reasoning behind answers within the BGI interviews expressed through 
words (White, 2000).  
 
Quantitative study 
The quantitative analysis was enriched by a closed question questionnaire. Data was 
collected at the Websummit and the questionnaire was administered both face to face and 
through an online survey described in chapter 3.3. The meanings are derived from numbers 
and the data is thus nominal, ordinal and in scales. Statistical models are used to analyse the 
results afterwards (White, 2000). For analysis, SPSS and Partial Leas Squares Software 
Smart (PLS) is used to test the hypotheses. PLS was chosen as only had 55 observations 
were collected and sample size is normally not a problem with PLS (Ringle, Wende and 
Will, 2005). PLS modelling is a variance-based structural equation modelling technique 
relying on the partial least squares algorithm (PLS school, 2016). It uses an algorithm to 
relate one or more dependent variables to two or more independent ones (Lorber, Wangen 
and Kowalski, 1987), which is the case in this study. PLS SEM uses bootstrapping to analyse 
significant relationships as the data is not normally distributed (Efron and Tibshirani, 1986; 
Davison and Hinkley, 1997). With this bootstrapping, subsamples are created randomly from 
the original sample. The PLS path model or structural model then relies on this subsample. 





The main unit of analysis are Building Global Innovators (BGI) alumni ventures. BGI is an 
innovation global accelerator based in Lisbon and Boston and founded in 2010. It was 
established from a partnership between the Portuguese government and the Massachusetts 
Institute for Technology (MIT). The accelerator is driven to create new local technology-
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based ventures and foster recently incorporated companies. (Building global innovators, 
2016B; Carvalho, Camacho, Amorim and Esperança, 2015).  
Unit of analysis 
Startup 1 is an Italian wearable technology company for high tech designer swim hardware 
(Startup 1, 2016). Startup 2 is company founded in the Lisbon instituto medicina molecular 
that established an immunization strategy to increase efficacy of medication for malaria 
(Startup 2, 2016). Startup 3 is an innovative and new product from London based company 
empowering people to control their health (Startup 3, 2016A; Startup 3, 2016B). Startup 4 
enables charity auctions, charitable shopping, supportive sales and donations (Startup 4, 
2016). Startup 5 is a platform for processing payments for B2B transportation services 
(Building global innovators, 2016B).  
 
Questionnaire 
For the Quantitative analysis, Websummit startup founders have been interviewed. The 
Websummit is a technology conference of startups of alpha and betta stages, investors 
several companies and interested people learning about hardware, software and media 
(Websummit, 2016).  
Unit of analysis 
The Websummit startups are working within the high technology sector of 23 different 
kinds. A list of the number of each startup in each industry category can be found in the 
appendix. Those were randomly selected in advance, driven from an online research that 
they participated in an accelerator conducted before the actual event.  
 
3.3 Method and Measures 
Interview and questionnaire 
For the qualitative study an interview guided by a questionnaire was conducted with the BGI 
sample. They are divided into three categories: demographics, organizational factors 
gathering the participation within the accelerator, questions on the interaction between the 
startup and the accelerator and between the startups. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted as a first step for the interviewees to share their perspectives and experiences of 
the social phenomena of unlearning. It provided with predetermined themes but also left 
room for free talking as the questions were open (Wahyuni, 2012). At the beginning 
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interviewees were provided with the interview flow, a rough understanding of the research 
purpose and the further process. Interviews were video recorded and took between 37 to 71 
minutes. Interviews were ended when the input of the respondent was exhausted and no new 
question could lead to a valuable result anymore. They were transcribed in a denaturalized 
transcription method, concentrating more on content than on actual expressions (Oliver, 
Serovich and Mason 2005) shortly after.  
The questions were gathered from previous research from Cohen and Bingham (2013) and 
Cohen (2013). For the control variables, Politis (2005) and Cegarra-Navarro, Sánchez-Vidal, 
and Cegarra-Leiva (2011) were reviewed.  
 
Online survey and questionnaire 
After the interview with BGI candidates, they were sent a closed question online survey for 
the quantitative study assessing unlearning and the content of knowledge that was changed 
as well as performance questions, whose measures will be described in the next section. The 
survey was done with Qualtrics, which on average took 20 minutes. 
With the Websummit candidates interviews were taken and additionally an online survey. 
Both were based on the same questionnaire as the closed questions online survey for BGI 
including demographic questions. The survey was sent to previously researched Websummit 
startups that could not be reached at the actual event. These methods were used to gather as 
much data as possible for the quantitative study of this research. The Websummit interviews 
took between eight and 17 minutes and some follow on emails were written. The questions 
on demographics were based on Cohen and Bingham (2013) and Cohen (2013) as well. The 
unlearning, knowledge type and outcome questions were replicated from the closed survey 




The unlearning scale for this study is taken from Cegarra-Navarro and Sanchez-Polo (2008) 
and Cepeda-Carrion, Cegarra-Navarro and Jimenez-Jimenez (2012). This is a 
psychometrically sound scale and has been tested before. It focuses on the individual 
unlearning process (Sweet, 2012). This scale was measured by Kurt Lewin’s unfreeze-move-
refreeze model that appropriately interconnects learning and change (Akgün, Byrne, Lynn, 
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and Keskin, 2007). It measures questions assessing the support of policies, rules, reporting, 
structures and decision-making practices to foster problem identification, making mistakes 
and new ways of doing something. Also, it includes questions around individual’s awareness 
of own mistakes, ways of thinking, and consciousness of erroneous behaviours directing 
day-to-day attitudes. Further it covered then questions that evaluate how an individual 
receives change, and implements it within the organization, collaborates with other members 
of the organization, and values risk-involvement and receiving new information. All these 
questions are assessed by an individuals’ evaluation on a Likert scale measuring his or her 
high disagreement (1) to high agreement (7). The to this study adapted unlearning scale from 
Cegarra-Navarro and Sanchez-Polo (2008) and Cepeda-Carrion, Cegarra-Navarro and 
Jimenez-Jimenez (2012) can be seen in the table 3 in Chapter 4.2. 
Reagarding the type of knowledge this study was influenced by previous research that 
assessed for technology, market and business knowledge within incubators Agarwal et al., 
2004; Marvel and Lumpkin, 2007; Van Weele and Rijnsoever, 2015). Technology 
knowledge questions were derived into the subgroups: products, technologies and processes. 
The Business knowledge was researched by the sub-questions: knowledge of how to start a 
business and how to manage and how to grow a business. Finally, the Market knowledge 
was adapted from Van Weele and Rijnsoever (2015). Questions considered knowledge of 
customers need and market operations. These knowledge type questions were then divided 
into radical or incremental knowledge type questions, as previous research indicated these 
learning types within incubators. Radical knowledge change would mean unlearning (there 
was knowledge before that is left behind) whereas incremental change refers to optimization 
(it is completely new knowledge that enriches current knowledge base). The learning types 
are assumed to be either radical changes or optimizations thus to get the real effect of 
unlearning, only the radical knowledge changes were considered. The unlearning variable 
represents the independent variable of the structural model established later (Van Weele and 
Rijnsoever, 2015). 
Important mediating variables are the knowledge types: technology knowledge, business 
knowledge and market knowledge. They are assumed to be the relevant knowledge types 
based on previous literature (Van Weele and Van Rijnsoever, 2015; Agarwal et al., 2004).  
Performance measures were adapted from Cohen and Bingham (2013). Cohen’s and 
Bingham’s (2013) measures assess the progress the firm has made and how much it has 
learnt from the program, the amount learnt from different actors and events (Cohen and 
Bingham, 2013). Furthermore, to assess the business performance the measures “sales before 
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the accelerator” and “sales one year after the accelerator” (Gruber, MacMillan and 
Thompson, 2016; Sullivan and Marvel, 2011) as well as “growth before the accelerator” and 
“growth one year after the accelerator”, “success beyond two years” (Regmi, Ahmed and 
Quinn, 2015) and employees before and after the accelerator, amount learned and progress 
made (Cohen and Bingham, 2013). The knowledge type variables were supposed to mediate 
unlearning and then affecting the outcome variables. 
 
Control variables 
Factors influencing how entrepreneurial founders unlearn within accelerators and what they 
(un)learn can be of diverse sources. The age of the founder(s) might influence how 
unlearning takes place. Research shows that older entrepreneurs are more likely to stick to 
set ways and to resist changing past practice (Cegarra-Navarro et al., 2011; Nystrom and 
Starbuck, 2015). Furthermore, the industry of the startup might influence how they unlearn. 
Stable environments will be more in need for lower level learning and optimizing existing 
practices (Uotila and Maula 2009; Van Rijnsoever, Meeus and Donders, 2012; Van Weele 
and Van Rijnsoever, 2015). Moreover, outcomes of potential prior ventures might influence 
how and what is being unlearned (Politis, 2005). Additionally the length of the program 
could be another influencer of what and how something is learned (Cohen, 2013). 
Furthermore affecting what and how unlearning is experienced might be the background and 
the amount of the other ventures of the cohort and their experience with prior ventures 
(Cohen and Bingham, 2013). 
 
4. Results Analysis 
The data collected aims to answer the research question of how nascent ventures unlearn 
within accelerators and if so, which contents. 
 
4.1. Findings qualitative study 
The five startups introduced in chapter 3 have different contexts and are operating in 
different industries within the high-tech field. The founders are between 28 to 40 years old. 
The degrees of the founders ranged from Bachelors to PhD’s and were mostly in Business 
and sometimes in Natural sciences, thus was always related. Startup 4 and 5 had prior 
ventures, whereas Startup 5 had a previous failure. The number of co-founders ranged from 
two to five, they were around 30 to 40 years old and had backgrounds related to the current 
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small businesses. Sometimes their backgrounds were similar to the founder ones (thus 
related), sometimes they had a complement related degree to the respective business. The 
product stages of all startups were mostly idea stage, only Startup 1 has been in the prototype 
stage.  
 
Outcomes of Prior ventures influencing Unlearning 
Startup 1, 2, 4 and 5 have unlearned. From these Startup 4 and 5 prior ventures where one 
has failed and one was successful. Therefore there is no clear evidence for a relationship of 
the outcomes of prior ventures to unlearning.  
 
Unlearning influencing Amount learned 
Unlearning could be identified for Startup 1, since the founder said they went through the 
program and found out that previous knowledge (focusing on an assumed customer without 
market research) was not efficient and discarded it. Accelerator personnel as well as cohorts 
advised to think of the whole potential market and to exploit the full business potential. The 
startup has identified this as an important learning. 
The founder of startup 2 claimed the firm changed their previous knowledge of how to 
aggregate technologies. They were advised they should not rely on the technology but also 
to have other accessories technology with a faster time to market allowing to guarantee that 
the venture is generating cash for investors. The founder claimed it was an important input 
but did not highlight it. 
Startup 4 unlearned about their product and its value proposition, as it was too competitive 
before. Also, the business plan was redesigned. This was an emotional and difficult process 
as they had already customers engaged who needed to adopt to new circumstances as well. 
Furthermore, they had developed the product for two years and then were advised to 
restructure a lot. The founder of startup 4 identified that this learning was crucial. 
Startup 5 refocused from starting with the product to first address a market need. The product 
was changed significantly as the payment system was connected to a combined 
transportation card for public transport. This one could consider a radical change where 
startup 5 engaged in unlearning. The founder did not highlight the unlearning as an important 
learning for his personal development. 
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 Three cases highlight the importance of unlearing for learning and one not, this relationship 
seems to be significant. 
 
Unlearning influencing Knowledge types 
The unlearning content of startup 1 can clearly be directed towards market knowledge. The 
founder of Startup 1 changed market knowledge radically, venture 2 changed radically their 
market and technology knowledge and venture 4 gained in market knowledge. The venture 
5 has increased its business and market knowledge through the accelerator in a considerable 
way. Therefore, there is a significant relationship to market knowledge, and in some cases 
also business and technology knowledge. 
 
Knowledge types influencing Business outcomes 
Startup 1 was not stressing the technology knowledge for the outcomes. Startup 2 named the 
market knowledge gained through unlearning as a major growth contributor. Venture 4 was 
stressed the importance of the unlearning for the outcomes, although one could assume it to 
be highly relevant. Venture 5 hasn’t gone ahead after participating in the accelerator due to 
high barrier to entry. So, outcomes on average radical knowledge changes did not contribute 




4.2 Findings quantitative study 
Descriptive Statistics  
Industry      Product stage 
Figure 2 Distribution of Product Stages 
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Figure 3 Industries, from http://www.wortwolken.com/  
The high technology industries range from Travel, Health Tech, Virtual Reality to Social 
Media. The most observed is HealthTech (0,18%); then Social media (0,09%) and FinTech 
(0,09%); then Travel, Internet of Things, eCommerce, Content and Media and Software as 
a Service with each 0,05% and the rest of the industries with 39% all together. 54 out of 55 
observations are high technology firms whose industry is very fast changing and hence one 
could assume that unlearning is crucial for their development (Van Rijnsoever et al., 2015).  
The product stage of the startups is mostly idea stage but also there is a considerable amount 
of revenue stage startups.  
 
Education, Experience, Prior ventures, Outcomes of prior ventures and age  
Table 1 Descriptives Entrepreneurial preparedness 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Education Founder 0,764 0,425 
Experience Founder 0,745 0,436 
Co-founder Background 0,745 0,436 
Prior Ventures 0,600 0,400 
Outcome Prior Venture 0,382 0,486 
Founder Age 36,073 0,840 
Average Co-founder age 29,182 14,544 
 
 The relatedness variables are binary variables thus 1 if related and 0 otherwise. Education 
and experience from all founders are on average almost the same and around 0,75 so it is 
more likely that 
previous gained 
Figure 4 Accelerator features 
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experience and education are related. Co-founders backgrounds (education and practice 
wise) were on average about the same so very likely to be related to the current venture. If 
founders had previous ventures, they were on average likely to be related to the current one. 
The outcomes of previous ventures were then on average less likely to be positive (1= 
successful, 0=failed). Age of founders was on average 36 and co-founders 29 years. 
Accelerator features and program duration 
 The data comprised 
32 different 
accelerators: Almost 
all had mentoring, 
networking and 
workshops. More 
than half had an 
investment policy 
and less than half 
provided alumni 
services or co-
working space. The accelerator length was on average 6 months, the shortest 2 months the 
longest 36 months. 
 
Outcome variables 
We collected two variables before and after the accelerator. We assessed success throughout 
the accelerator process. Table 2 shows a small increase in sales and growth through the 
program. The number of employees almost doubled after the accelerator. Success after two 
years was collected to measure performance with some time lag. The amount learnt and the 
progress made during the time in the accelerator indicated that participants agreed to have 
learnt and to have made progress. 
Table 2 Descriptives Outcome variables 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Sales before 4,055 1,656 
Sales after 4,855 1,531 
Employees before 7,600 8,261 
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Employees after 15,345 21,406 
Growth before 4,691 1,559 
Faced Growth 4,891 1,614 
Amount learned 5,055 1,432 
Progress made 5,600 1,138 
 
 
The success after two years of the accelerator was then mostly that the venture was currently 
still operating: 
Figure 5 Success after two years 
 
The current funding round on average was the first round (seed funding), three were exiting, 
one was dead and four were younger than two years. 
 
Measurement model 
To test the measurement of the model the following correlations were tested (Costa, Lages 
and Hortinha, 2015): 
 
Individual item Reliability 
As a first step, the knowledge type questions were assessed with a reliability test. Cronbach 
alphas were higher than 0,8 to be considered as good  and inter-item-correlations were sought 
to have a high value as well (Gliem, and Gliem, 2003). If this was not the case, then the 
respective item was cut from the measure, see the values not market with a * (See table 3 





Table 3 Descriptives Unlearning 





I was able to identify problems* 5,364 1,166 0,623 (0,000) 
I was able to see mistakes by my colleagues 4,745 1,504  
I was able to listen to my customers 5,091 1,900  
I was able to share work related information 
with my colleagues easily* 
5,455 1,277 0,516 (0,013) 
I was able to reflect and learn from my 
mistakes* 
6,018 1,286 0,450 (0,006) 
New situations have helped me identify my 
own mistakes* 
5,618 1,300 0,651 (0,000) 
New situations have helped me recognize 
undesirable attitudes 
5,145 1,285  
New situations have helped me identify 
improper behaviors 
4,673 1,619  
I recognized when forms of reasoning or 
solutions were inadequate* 
5,036 1,264 0,740 (0,000) 
New situations have helped me change my 
behaviors* 
5,382 1,408 0,681 (0,000) 
New situations have helped me change my 
attitudes* 
5,345 1,365 0,723 (0,000) 
New situations have helped me change my 
thoughts* 
5,436 1,332 0,504 (0,026) 
I was open to new ideas and new ways of 
doing something* 
6,182 0,974 0,397 (0,000) 
I have tried to initiate projects and introduce 
innovations 
5,655 1,504  
I recognized the value of new information, 
assimilated and applied it 
5,982 1,018 0,621 (0,000) 
I adopted the suggestions with members of the 
organization to solve problems together 
5,727 0,943 0,598 (0,000) 
I was prone to collaborate with members of 
the organization to solve problems together 
5,927 1,076 0,592 (0,002) 
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I was concerned with the fact that the manner 
of answering before unforeseen circumstances 
will be known by all 
3,909 1,842  
Cronbach alpha for items indicated with *: 0,860 
 
Knowledge types 
Table 4 Descriptives Knowledge types 




























Radical Business knowledge change     
Radical 
changes of how 
to start a 
business* 
3,200 1,882 1 7 0,950 (0,000) 
Radical 
changes of how 
to manage a 
business* 
2,800 1,656 1 7 0,911 (0,000) 
Radical 
changes of how 
to grow a 
business 















3,036 1,695 1 7 0,669 (0,118) 
Radical 
changes of how 
markets 
operate 









Convergent validity, is proven with the Cronbach alphas just presented and construct 
reliability coefficients (Costa et al., 2015). Convergent validity takes two measures which 
are supposed to measure the same construct and proofs their relationship. Convergent 
validity can be assumed as the factor loadings of the variables are significant, which can be 
taken from the table 3 and table 4 (Bagozzi, 1980). 
Also, the average variance extracted (AVE) of each variable is greater than 0,5 (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981). This is can be seen in the Table 5. 
 









































































































































































































































































Discriminant validity investigates if two measures that should not be related are indeed not 
related (Carlson and Herdman, 2012). For this measurement the correlation between each 
pair of constructs with the root of AVE among those constructs is analysed (see in the table 
below) (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Also, cross-loadings between items and constructs were 
reviewed (Chin, 1998).  
The table shows that the square root of AVE between all combined constructs (on the 
diagonal) is greater than their respective correlation except for market knowledge on 
business knowledge (Costa et al. 2015). Items further proofed to have a high and significant 




In order to test our hypotheses we are going to analyse the structural model. 
The first hypothesis derived is the following: 
Outcomes of prior ventures influencing Unlearning 
It became clear that outcomes of prior ventures is correlated negatively (beta=-0.216). This 
would mean that if the venture has had success in the past, it is likely to be accompanied by 
less unlearning within the new venture, as assumed. However, the relationship is not 
significant (P>0,11). H1 must therefore be rejected 
Unlearning influencing Amount learned 
The analysis made obvious that unlearning has a positive and significant relationship to the 
amount the venture has learned within the accelerator (beta=0.396, P=0,023). This would 
mean, that the unlearning increased the amount learned in a significant way. Thus, H2 is 
proven and the accelerator increased the amount of learning through unlearning.  
 
Unlearning influencing Knowledge type changes 
When looking at the relationship of unlearning to each knowledge type change, one can see 
that overall the relationship correlate positively. Market knowledge hereby shows the least 
                                                          
1 Criterion after Rice (1989). 
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strong effect (beta=0.115, P>0,1), then comes technology knowledge (beta=0.253, P>0,1) 
and then business knowledge (beta=0.134, P>0,1) Thus H3 must first be rejected.  
 
Knowledge types influencing Business outcomes 
The betas and p-values can be taken from table 6.  
Table 6 Relationships from knowledge types to outcome variables 
Relationship Beta P-value 
Business knowledge changeAmount learned  0,320 0,022 
Business knowledge changeProgress Made 0,293 0,100 
Business knowledge changeSales after 0,368 0,012 
Business knowledge changeGrowth after 0,353 0,013 
Business knowledge changeEmployees after 0,080 >0,1 
Business knowledge changeSuccess after 2 years 0,122 >0,1 
Market knowledge changeAmount learned -0,045 >0,1 
Market knowledge changeProgress Made 0,012 >0,1 
Market knowledge changeSales after -0,251 >0,1 
Market knowledge changeGrowth after -0,214 >0,1 
Market knowledge changeEmployees after 0,115 >0,1 
Market knowledge changeSuccess after 2 years -0,316 >0,1 
Technology knowledge changeAmount learned -0,174 >0,1 
Technology knowledge changeProgress Made -0,082 >0,1 
Technology knowledge changeSales after -0,024 >0,1 
Technology knowledge changeGrowth after 0,057 >0,1 
Technology knowledge changeEmployees after 0,023 >0,1 
Technology knowledge changeSuccess after 2 years 0,337 0,076 
 
Overall, business knowledge changes have a positive relationship to the outcome variables 
particularly in the current period. Furthermore, it affects the level of learning, progress made 
and growth faced by the startup. Only success after two years is not affected significantly. 
Therefore, H4A can be accepted. 
Market knowledge proves to be negatively correlated to the outcome variables of different 
times on average. Only employees after is increased, however not significantly.  Therefore, 
H4B must be rejected. 
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Technology knowledge then has varying positive and negative correlations to the outcome 
variables of different types. Here, a significant and positive relationship of the technology 
knowledge change to success after two years can be established. Therefore H4C can be 
accepted and thus H4 is partially confirmed. 
One could think the knowledge types to be a mediator between unlearning and the outcome 
variables as the knowledge questions were separating between radical and incremental 
knowledge. However, this should be investigated in more detail. 
 
Control Variables 
The startup specific context was analysed to influence unlearning. The Industry did not 
influence unlearning and product stage of the ventures also failed to reach significant levels 
(β=0.058, p > 0,10). 
Entrepreneurial Preparedness variables were assessed: founder experience (β=0,014,p > 0.10 
) , founder education (β=-0,141, p > 0.10), prior ventures (β=-0.116, p > 0.10) and founder 
age (β=-0.331, p = 0.015). Also the co-founders background (β=-0.004, p > 0.10) and 
average co-founder age (β=-0.032, p > 0.10) was included. From the analysis only founder 
age had a significant but negative relationship to unlearning 
Accelerator learning enhancers are the accelerator features mentoring, networking, co-
working, and workshops and also investment which can affect the unlearning behavior. None 
of these factors had a significant relationship to unlearning: investment β =0.054, 
Networking β= -0,021, Mentoring β= 0.037, Workshops β= -0,307 and Co-working β= 0.051 
all with p > 0,10. 
The length of the program had no influence on the entrepreneurs ability to unlearn 
(β=0.055, p > 0.10;)  
 
4.3 Discussion 
Factors influencing unlearning 
Our study indicates that unlearning is partly experienced within the accelerator.  The 
majority of startups interviewed showed some indication they were able to challenge basic 
beliefs, and were willing to rethink business and market approach in the hope of a more 
successful stance in the future. 
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The ability to challenge the current knowledge basis is independent of the product stage. 
This indicates that startups in the revenue stage can engage in unlearning. Interestingly our 
findings show that unlearning is not dependent on the industry the startup is based in. 
Although our sample is in the fast paced industry two startups of the same industry 
experienced opposite levels of unlearning.  
Entrepreneurial preparedness factors had no influence with the exception of founder’s age. 
Age should be correlated with experience and the amount learned in the past, so these 
relationships should be investigated with more detail. Furthermore, the accelerator activities 
did not affect unlearning significantly which we believe to be a puzzling result. Nevertheless 
this points to previous findings were the effects were found to be small (Cohen, 2013; 
Pauwels, et al., 2016). The program duration we unveiled a negative effect meaning the 
shorter the program the more unlearned, as assumed, however not significantly influencing 
unlearning (Cohen, 2013). 
Surprisingly we could not find an effect about having previous ventures and unlearning. Both 
the exploratory interviews and the survey failed to show such relationship. Although we 
found a positive effect meaning that if the venture has had success in the past, it is likely to 
unlearn within the new venture, we have not reached significant levels.  
 
Unlearning influencing amount learned 
Interestingly startups recognized that when long held beliefs are questioned the perceived 
learning increases. Our interviews clearly show this positive relationships as three of the 
four interviews were convinced of their contribution to learning. This finding was further 
supported by the quantitative study where respondents reported high levels of learning 
when they experienced unlearning. 
 
Unlearning influencing knowledge types 
When investigating where the questioning about assumptions was more likely to happen 
during the exploratory interviews we found evidence of market knowledge and technology 
knowledge. Nevertheless we were not able to replicate these findings in our quantitative 
study. Unlearning is more likely to be related to radical changes as they require new 





Knowledge types influencing Business Outcomes 
Finally, startups within exploratory interviews could not express what exactly contributed to 
growth. Particularly how unlearning allowed them to change their knowledge basis and as 
such grow. 
Interestingly, quantitative findings showed a positive and significant relationship from 
Business knowledge to amount learned, to progress made, to sales after one year and to 
growth after one year. Thus this knowledge types is beneficial to startups sustainability 
although we need caution about the high-tech industry participants. 
Technology knowledge does not affect results but it relates to positive success two years 
after the program. A reason is that technology needs time to develop and to materialize. For 
example, getting a patent takes time and does not increase sales or growth immediately.  
Market knowledge, although non-significant showed a negative coefficient to all outcome 
variables but progress made and employees after one year. Non significance might be related 
to some confusion about the difference between business and market knowledge, thus it 
might have been assessed with business knowledge. Radical market knowledge might harms 
current sales. During the interviews one founder explained they were in business for two 
years and unlearned within the accelerator in market knowledge. The program advised to 
change the value proposition which could have harmed sales. Success after two years is 
correlated negatively to market knowledge. This would mean if you change market 
knowledge it impacts even negatively after two years. Radical market knowledge further 
shows a positive effect to employees after. An interpretation for this could be that the value 
proposition was changed and thus now more customers are addressed, so the customer 
support team must increase. Therefore radical market knowledge change is overall rather 
detrimental in the short run to the venture cash flow, as ventures need to radically change 
customers and therefore the fundamentals of the baseline. 
 
5 Conclusion and implications 
The aim of this work was to assess what and how startups who go through accelerators 
change their knowledge basis. The unlearning process within accelerators was theoretically 
established through a framework and later on tested through an emprical study.  
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The theory suggests that entrepreneurial preparedness and especially failures with previous 
ventures were directing the unlearning behavior of entrepreneurs when they engage in EL 
again. The assumed relationship was proven overall by the quantitative study but not in a 
significant way. 
The ventures unlearned according to this work overall, increasing the amount learned within 
the accelerator and the progress made, as theory was suggesting.  
From previous studies it was also assumed that unlearning increased the business, 
technology and market knowledge by ventures. Maybe because the startup’s background 
was within high technology, their unlearning content was more explained by business 
knowledge, how to start and manage a business. Market knowledge might have been 
mistaken by business knowledge and was not showing a significant radical change. The 
qualitative findings were stressing all three knowledge types but significantly only market 
knowledge.  
Theory was further assuming a positive relationship of the learning contents to the business 
outcomes. The business leanings did indeed prove to contribute to the small firm’s business 
outcomes. The technology learning materalized after two years, perhaps as enduring 
intellectual property rights need to be get by startups. Qualitative results stressed the 
unlearned business and market knowledge as crucial growth contributions. Overall, the study 
shows that the gained knowledge types show a significant relationship to the outcomes of 
firms. 
 
5.1 Implications for Research 
This study increased the research done on accelerators and it contributed to EL literature by 
investigating the ventures unlearning process and content. Furthermore, it analyzes the role 
of accelerators as triggers for unlearning and in that it supports that unlearning increases EL. 
Moreover, findings enriched insights on exploratory learning that contributes to the key 
challenge opportunity exploration (Morgan and Berthon, 2008; Wang et al., 2014).  
 
5.2 Implications for Practice 
The above conducted analysis has several advantages for accelerators and startups.  
For Entrepreneurs it is especially important to gain knowledge about how their team can 
unlearn and what assumptions are likely to be unlearnt (so they will understand what are the 
skills and knowledge they are lacking) in order for them to stay flexible and gain in 
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entrepreneurial preparedness. It is argued to be useful to have an outsider on your side to 
break established frameworks (Akgün, Lynn and Byme, 2006). Further, entrepreneurs can 
understand the circumstances influencing unlearning. Staying flexible through unlearning is 
generally in their specific interest since they are developing their product or service over 
time and need to adapt to fast changing environments (Nystrom and Starbuck, 2015; Wang 
et al., 2014). Since the unlearning process can be quite sensitive and hard for the entrepreneur 
an understanding can be crucial for entrepreneurs (Zahra et al., 2011).  For corporates 
unlearning can lead to better business outcomes (Baker and Sinkular, 1999; Morgan and 
Berthon, 2008; Sherwood, 2000)).  So, eventually in the longer term, when their business is 
more established they should have an understanding of not to rely on their current knowledge 
base only and thus have a capacity to do things differently (Cope, 2011). This might improve 
their business outcomes as well.  
Managers and mentors of accelerators will be more aware of the topics they need to prepare 
before startups enter the program and therefore with an understanding of what knowledge is 
likely to be unlearnt can leverage the program, which could lead to a gain in reputation.  
Also, they will know better wat influences unlearning and which mental steps the 
entrepreneurs go through when discarding knowledge and can adapt to these circumstances. 
Especially they can help entrepreneurs with the negative emotions they might have from the 
learning anxiety (Zahra et al., 2011). Therefore, accelerators should enhance the 
understanding of unlearning within the program. 
 
5.3 Limitations  
Generally speaking and following Tsang and Zahra (2008) to investigate the unlearning 
process empirically is in itself is a complex task. Various factors are influencing this 
phenomena. For example, future work could include the opinions of co-founders of the 
respective ventures. Those have been left out so far and the interviewed founders were only 
asked for general demographics about them. Also to interview the accelerators and mentors 
for their opinions on the learnings would enrich the data (Cohen and Bingham, 2013). 
Additionally, the timing between the interview and the event could be shorter as 
entrepreneurs may not recall exactly all events making it hard to remember the learnings 
they got out of specific tasks. Also personal attributes and motivation being part of the 
entrepreneur’s preparedness could have influenced the results that were left out in this study. 
Furthermore, the study could be improved by having instead of binary variables an 
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assessment of the workshop activities to further understand how the activities of the 
accelerator contribute to unlearning. 
 A bigger sample less concentrated in technology is needed to generalize the results. 
A further limitation is that interviews were conducted in English and interviewees were 
Portuguese, raising language barriers. Also some respondents from the Websummit reported 
too much background noise from the event might have further complicated the Websummit 
respondent’s ability to give an accurate answer.  This was further aggravated when startups 
did not take time to think about everything properly. Moreover, one should consider that the 
researcher’s expert bias might have driven replies from the questionnaire in a certain 
direction (White, 2000). 
 
5.4 Future research 
Future research could test the hypotheses with a bigger sample and assess business outcomes 
after two years. Also a more diversified sample would be interesting to prove for unlearning. 
Future research questions could attempt to answer: How can accelerators facilitate 
unlearning? How can managers of entrepreneurial ventures that came out of accelerator 
programs best implement organizational unlearning? Can unlearning be influenced by 
certain factors or mechanisms? (e.g. cognitive mechanisms, see Baron (1998), deutereo 
learning, personality types). Future research could also include the entrepreneurs’ 
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List of Websummit startups within industries 
The 23 industries include Travel (3 cases), Business Intelligence (2 cases), Virtual Reality 
(2 cases), Internet of Things (3 cases), Software (1 case), FinTech (5 cases), HealthTech (10 
cases), eCommerce (3 cases), Data science (1 case), Enterprise (2 cases), Content & Media 
(3 cases), Social Media (5 cases), Lifestyle (1 case), HR & Recruitment (2 cases), Marketing 
(2 cases), Sports & Fitness (2 cases), Open source software (1 case), Security (1 case), Peer 
to Peer lending (1 case), Cloud Infrastructure (1 case) Software as a Service (3 cases) and 
Charity (1 case). 
 
